Our analysis proceeds from the question that if grammar alone is insufficient to identify the action of an imperative (e.g., offering, directing, warning, begging, etc.) how can interlocutors come to recognise the specific action being performed by a given imperative? We argue that imperative directives that occur after the directed action could have first been relevantly performed explicitly direct the actions of the recipient and tacitly treat the absence of the action as a failure for which the recipient is accountable. The tacit nature of the accountability orientation enables both parties to focus on restoring progressivity to the directed course of action rather than topicalising a transgression. Data are from everyday interactions in British and American English.
INTRODUCTION
Imperatives are one of the three major sentence types, together with interrogatives and declaratives (Sadock & Zwicky, 1985) . Like other grammatical formats (e.g., interrogatives, see Schegloff, 1984) , speakers use imperatives to perform a wide range of actions, including offering, directing, warning, initiating repair, and begging among others. The multiplicity of actions that imperatives perform leads to a puzzle, one that analysts and participants alike must solve: If an imperative format does not afford a default analysis of its action (e.g., as a request or directive), then how do participants come to recognise the specific action(s) that an imperative performs?
Imperatives are an example of the Òone-to-many and many-to-one relationshipsÓ between linguistic forms (i.e., practices) and interactional functions (i.e., actions) that Walker (2014) discusses as she cautions conversation analysts against conflating form and function. In this paper, we begin to disentangle imperative grammar from (some of) the many actions it is used to perform. We narrow in on a specific interactional contingency that speakers recurrently use imperative actions to manage: directing the actions of others (Goodwin, 2006; Craven & Potter, 2010; Kent, 2012b; Goodwin & Cekaite, 2013) . That is, first pair parts that make embodied compliance conditionally relevant as a next action (Kent 2012a) . Within this class of imperative directives, we observe two basic types: (i) those that simply direct the actions of others (e.g., Òpass the bread pleaseÓ) and (ii) those that not only prospectively direct the actions of others but also retrospectively treat the recipient as accountable for their current actions or inaction (e.g., Òtell me the goddamn storyÓ). This paper examines the interactional resources that participants use to recognise whether an imperative directive simply tells them to do something or also tacitly holds them accountable for failing to have already relevantly performed the action. We argue that the position of the imperative directive within a course of action is crucial. Imperative directives that follow the relevance of the directed action not only direct the recipient to act but also find fault in his or her current actions or inaction.
BACKGROUND

!
Grammar and action
!
With apparent ease and remarkable speed, participants in interaction are able to recognise the action that a turn at talk implements and produce a relevant response. Just how this is done, however, remains elusive. Schegloff (2007) states the problem as follows: Òhow are the resources of the language, the body, the environment of the interaction, and position in the interaction fashioned into conformations designed to be, and to be recognized by recipients as, particular actionsÉ?Ó (p. xiv). In general, two solutions to this problem seem possible (Levinson, 2013) . First, the form of an action (the linguistic construction of a turn at talk, the physical production of a gesture) may furnish the resources necessary for its recognition. Early philosophical investigations of action adopted this position (e.g., Austin, 1962) and recent empirical studies have suggested that such a solution may be possible (Couper-Kuhlen, 2014) . Second, the context in which an action occurs, not only its form, may provide the necessary resources. This has been the dominant position in CA since SacksÕs (1992) insight that answers depend on questions to be recognisable as such. Sequenceinitiating actions have also been shown to be sensitive to sequential position, taking different forms in different environments (Wootton, 1997; Curl, 2006; Rossi, 2012 Rossi, , 2014 Zinken & Ogiermann, 2013) . In a more recent turn, the specification of context thought relevant for action recognition has been radically extended beyond the local sequence to include properties of individuals, such as epistemic status (Heritage, 2012) , deontic authority (Stevanovic & PerŠkylŠ, 2012) , and personal benefit (Clayman & Heritage, 2014) .
In the case of directives, it is evident that imperative grammar alone is not sufficient for action recognition. If an imperative can just as well express a wish as give a command (e.g., Ògive me a tenÓ as one rolls dice), then clearly more than imperative grammar is necessary. Moreover, as Mandelbaum (2014) has shown, participants can use directives to implement multiple actions simultaneously, adding a further dimension to the problem of action recognition. For example, when discussing a motherÕs directive to her son to Òcut that (up)/(out)Ó, Schegloff (1989) noted in passing that it Òis not just an injunction or instruction, or request. In setting out an alternative way of eating, it can do a complaint about his prior behaviourÓ (p. 149). Drew (1998, p. 297) notes that actions can be Òbuilt to manifest transgressions by others of normative standards of conductÓ. Calling an interlocutor to account for their behaviour can be used to highlight and police normative social standards. Researchers have described a broad range of practices through which one interlocutor can hold another accountable for non-normative or transgressive conduct: unanswerable polar interrogatives (Heinemann, 2008) , ÒwhÓ-questions (Koshik, 2005; Bolden & Robinson, 2011) , characterising something as absent or a failure (Schegloff, 1988) , negative assessments about the recipientÕs behaviour (Hepburn & Potter, 2011) , extreme-case formulations (Edwards, 2000) , and formulating behaviour as dispositional (Edwards, 1995) or collusive (Potter & Edwards, 1990) . Stances towards the accountability of conduct can be signalled though related actions such as Òaccusing, criticising, blaming, challenging, advising, and so onÓ (Robinson, 2016, p. 31) .
Accountability
Recognising how and when speakers hold each other accountable for failing to perform an expected action is a subtle and delicate matter that is not always performed overtly in interaction. For example, oh-prefaced responses to inquiries indicate that, Òfrom the perspective of the answerer, a question is problematic in terms of its relevance, presuppositions, or contextÓ (Heritage, 1998, p. 291) . It doesnÕt take much to add in a hint of accountability to an utterance. As Robinson (2016) notes, Òchanging the ÒmixÓ of practices (including both their composition and position) can subtly or dramatically change the nature of the actionÓ (p. 19). We investigate how imperative directives (actions designed to get someone to do something) can also be heard as tacitly holding recipients accountable for delaying the progressivity of the directed action.
Projectability and progressivity
In interaction, actions (whether produced through language or the body) can produce recognisable, normative structures that develop over time. At the level of turn-taking, Sacks et al. (1974) described how participants monitor each otherÕs talk for how it progresses towards possible completion points that would indicate a relevant place for speaker transition. At the level of adjacency pairs, Schegloff (2007) described how particular kinds of initiating actions make relevant type-fitted responsive actions. Pairs of actions can be strung together into complex sequences of sequences (Schegloff, 2007) , which themselves can form recognisable activities (Levinson, 1992; Heritage & Sorjonen, 1994) , all of which occur within the overall structural organisation of the interaction (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; Robinson, 2013) . At each level of structure, the progressive realisation of an action allows for the projection of what is yet to come (Lerner & Raymond, 2008) .
The structure of a course of action, be it the telling of a story or the preparation of a meal, sets up normative expectations about how participants will behave and what form their contributions will take. In many cases, Òthe recognizability of completion (i.e., what it will take to materially complete a project) and the projectability of that completion from the outset of the activityÓ can provide an accountable and easily monitored frame of projectable relevance to structure participation in the activity (Lerner, 1995, p. 129) . Thus, courses of action that have been initiated but have not yet come to completion remain relevant and consequential for the interaction until they have reached a recognisable conclusion.
Interlocutors are morally responsible for recognising, understanding and adhering to relevance rules (including the normative progressivity of courses of action). Nonperformance of a relevant action is an accountable and sanctionable matter (Garfinkel, 1963 (Garfinkel, , 1967 , particularly for courses of action to which both parties have displayed a prior commitment (c.f., Rossi, 2012) . The smooth and timely progression through a course of action to its eventual completion can be monitored on the basis of the projectable relevance of the constituent elements. As Schegloff (2007, p. 15) states, Òmoving from some element to a hearably next one with nothing intervening is the embodiment of, and the measure of, progressivityÓ. Once a course of action has been initiated, participants can orient to the relevance of its completion (Lerner, 1998; Lerner & Raymond, 2008) , such that if it stalls or fails to progress, participants may use practices designed to reinstate progressivity. Importantly, as Lerner and Raymond have shown, progressivity and projectability operate not only on courses of action implemented through talk but also those implemented through embodied actions.
DATA AND METHODS
The analysis draws on a broad collection of over 690 grammatical imperatives systematically identified in 46 video-recorded interactions between speakers of English in the U.K. and U.S across a variety of non-institutional settings. Approximately 9 hours of data are of adult interactions and approximately 5 hours involve children and adults. All names appearing in transcripts are pseudonyms and informed consent was gained for all recordings.
Consistent with conversation analysis, it is possible to begin an analysis with either practices or actions. In contrast to previous studies of directives, which have taken the social action as their point of departure (e.g., Kent, 2012b) , our methodological approach mirrors that of Schegloff (1997, p. 506 ) who began with a series of practices for initiating repair and proceeded to Òexamine occasions in which they are deployed to quite different effectÓ. By starting with grammatical imperatives rather than the social action of admonishing or directing we aim to address MondadaÕs (2011, p. 19) observation that Òstudies focusing on directives produced by using imperative verbs are scarce, and their situated use in specific social actions remains understudiedÓ (but see Rossi, 2012; Zinken & Ogiermann, 2013) . ! The analysis presented below focuses only on cases in which an imperative performed the action of a directive Ð to make observable compliance (as opposed to nonobservable compliance, e.g., ÒimagineÓ) relevant immediately in next position (Kent, 2012a) . In restricting our focus to imperative directives, we have excluded the following types of imperatives from our analysis: -! Deferred action requests (e.g., "tell me how it goes"; Lindstrom, 1997); -! Cognitive-state imperatives (e.g., Òimagine this is the building I live inÓ); -! Affective-state imperatives (e.g., Òbe confidentÓ); -! Turn-initial particles (e.g., ÒlookÓ, ÒseeÓ); -! First-person imperatives (e.g., ÒletÕs XÓ, Òlet me XÓ); -! Prohibitives or grammatically negative imperatives (e.g., ÒdonÕt whisperÓ).
IMPERATIVES THAT PRECEDE THE RELEVANCE OF THE DIRECTED ACTION
The imperative directives in our collection formulate actions for recipients to perform in next position. In many cases, the action the imperative directs the recipient to perform (i.e., the directed action) has no relevance prior to the production of the imperative. The imperative itself initiates a course of action and establishes the relevance of the directed action. In this position, an imperative directive simply directs the recipient to perform a newly relevant action. In Extract 1, Wesley issues the imperative directive to Mum for her to Òpass the bread (please)Ó (line 7).
Extract 1 (Virginia 11:42) 1 PRU:
He got knee walkin' drunk. at thuh wu-2 MOM:
At the [wedding. 3 PRU:
[rehearsal.<I mean at thuh: wedding reception.
[
úu h h h h h h h h ] ((through mouth)) 6 PRU:
[t!A:N:' somebody pushed 'im] in the pool. 7 WES: *Pass the* bread, +[(please.) 8 PRU:
[An' he thought it was so much fu:n, wes *points--* pru +reaches for bread basket--> 9 th't he went back n'-an'+ got up on thuh diving board, pru -->+passes it to Wes-->> 10 anÕ started divin' inÀ ehhhh! huh! Note that there is no prior indication that Wesley might be seeking to have the bread passed to him. As an action, Prudence passing him the bread is only made relevant once Wesley has issued the directive. Consequently the directed action was not projectable until the directive has been issued.
Although imperative directives can initiate courses of action, as happens here, they more commonly occur within courses of action that have already been set in motion (Wootton, 1997; Rossi, 2012; Zinken & Ogiermann, 2013; Mondada, 2014a) . We have found that speakers can use imperative directives to progress from one ÔstepÕ of a course of action to a next (cf. Schegloff, 2007) . The next step in a course of action may be projectable (i.e., it will need to happen at some point), but the immediate relevance of the directed action (i.e., position in which it should occur) is nonetheless still contingent upon the directive.
In Extract 2, Dad is demonstrating visual convergence to his two daughters. The crucial part of the demonstration is the moment when they switch their focus from MumÕs nose (which is distant) to the pen (which is nearby). Although the nature of the experiment makes it projectable that Daisy will need to look at the pen at some point, the exact moment at which that action becomes relevant is contingent upon (and established by) DadÕs imperative directive Ònow concentrate on the pe:n.Ó (line 14). Before the directive is issued, Daisy is not remiss in not having already looked at the pen, as Dad's previous prohibitives make apparent (lines 4 and 6).
In both cases above the relevance of the directed action follows the production of the imperative. This holds for imperative directives that initiate courses of action as well as those that prospectively manage in-progress courses of action. There is no evidence in the interaction that the imperative directives find fault with the recipients' actions or inactions or hold them accountable for some failure to have performed a projectably relevant action.
IMPERATIVES THAT FOLLOW THE RELEVANCE OF THE DIRECTED ACTION
In contrast, imperatives that are issued after the directed action has already become projectable and relevant within the interaction not only explicitly direct the recipient to perform the action and thereby enforce its production, but they also tacitly treat the recipient as accountable for not having already done so. We might gloss these as accountability-oriented imperative directives. In this section, we illustrate the core phenomenon with two initial cases and then consider how responses to imperative directives in this position provide evidence for the analysis.
Two initial specimens of the phenomenon
Across the collection, imperative directives that follow the relevance of the directed action generally differ along two dimensions: how the directed action becomes relevant in the interaction and how overtly the participants orient to the recipientÕs accountability for the prior performance of the action. The two initial specimens in this section indicate the diversity that we observe the collection.
Extract 3 below, comes from a game of Monopoly between two friends. After they set up the board, Luke produces a story preface (Sacks, 1974) , projecting the relevance of a story-telling (line 2). However, rather then produce a response that would allow the story to progress, Rick blocks the telling, proposing that they first establish the rules of the game (lines 3-5). At a lapse in the conversation and between turns in the game, Luke puts down an empty can of beer, picks up a new one, and produces ÒalrightÓ as a Òchange of activity tokenÓ (Gardner, 2007) . This indicates his preparedness for the next, possibly gamerelated action. The pauses on lines 24 and 26 are opportunities in which Luke could, but does not, resume the telling. It is in this interactional environment that Rick issues the imperative directive: Òtell me the goddamn sto(h)ryÓ (line 27).
The relevance of the directed action precedes the directive itself. The multiple attempts to launch the story have established the relevance of its telling such that its absence has become noticeable and its production enforceable, as evidenced by the directive. The increment Òbefore you rollÓ (line 30) makes explicit that the story should be told before Luke takes his next turn in the game. It treats LukeÕs involvement in the game as the cause of the delay, holding him accountable for the inaction. Moreover, RickÕs account initially attributes responsibility to Luke explicitly (Òbecause if you canÕt y-Ó) before a subsequent self-repair (from ÒyouÓ to ÒweÓ) collectivises the blame (see Lerner & Kitzinger, 2007) . The design of the imperative itself orients to the recipientÕs accountability for the production of the directed action. The insertion of the expletive ÒgoddamnÓ displays the speakerÕs frustration and upgrades the directive, constructing it as a subsequent and perhaps final attempt to elicit the story.
In Extract 3, the orientation to the recipientÕs accountability for prior nonperformance of the directed action is explicit. Across the collection, however, explicit references to accountability are the exception. Instead, orientations to accountability typically occurred more tacitly, as though smuggled beneath an explicit imperative directive that targets getting the recipient to perform the directed action. Extract 4 comes from the beginning of a family mealtime after the food has been served but before the participants have begun to eat. When asked how to say ÒletÕs enjoyÓ in French, seven-year-old Emily responds Òbon appetitÓ, an expression that normally marks the commencement of a meal. Rather than begin to eat, however, Emily begins to repeat Òbon appetitÓ in a lyrical tone, the third of which appears on line 1. The structure of the activity in which the participants are engaged (a family mealtime) provides for the relevance of specific actions, eating being foremost among them. The expression Òbon appetitÓ marks the transition from serving to eating, but Emily transforms this transitional action into an activity in its own right Ð singing Òbon appetitÓ and thereby delays the meal. In this interactional environment, the absence of the relevant next action Ð beginning to eat Ð is evidentially noticeable to Mum who interrupts EmilyÕs fourth verse of Òbon appetitÓ with the imperative directive Òea:tÓ (line 9). The directive enforces the relevance of the directed action, treats EmilyÕs actions as sanctionable, and on that basis tacitly holds her accountable for the delay. After Emily continues her playful performance (lines 10-11), Mum reissues her directive, which eventually elicits the relevant action as Emily picks up her cutlery and begins to eat (line 11).
In comparison to Extract 3, the orientation to the recipientÕs accountability for the performance of the previously-relevant directed action is less explicit in Extract 4. The prosodic stress with which Mum says Òea:tÓ is the only turn design feature present to index accountability. Prosodic stress can invite a recipient to search for what it locates as the other part of a pair (Schegloff, 1998) . In this case, the stress on Òea:tÓ potentially locates EmilyÕs current actions as the other member of the set, selects the directed action as the relevant and appropriate behaviour, and thereby treats her current actions as inappropriate and not currently relevant. In this way, the prosodically stressed imperative performs not only explicitly directs the recipient to perform the directed action, enforcing the relevance of its production, but it also finds fault in her current actions and tacitly orients to her accountability for the prior nonperformance of the directed action.
Extracts 3 and 4 use imperatives to explicitly direct the actions of the recipient. We argue they also (to varying degrees) tacitly treat the absence of the action as a noticeable failure for which the recipient is being held accountable. In the remainder of this section we will address how recipients orient to the prior relevance of the directed action and their accountability for failing to have performed it when it first became relevant. We also consider the limits of this phenomenon by exploring cases where a tacit orientation to accountability rests solely on the sequential position of the imperative directive without additional turn design indicators. A concomitant consideration throughout will be the different grounds on which an action comes to be treated as both relevant (and noticeably absent) within the interaction.
Orientations to Accountability in Next Position
The preferred response to an imperative directive is immediate embodied compliance (Kent, 2012a ). An imperative is built to prioritise the swift performance of the directed action over any accounts, apologies or other displays of contrition. The preference organisation for directive sequences thus does not promote the kind of responses that would explicitly orient to the imperative as holding the recipient accountable for their inaction. As a consequence, when a recipient is faced with an explicit imperative to perform a directed action and a tacit implication that they are accountable for failing to have performed a relevant action, additional work is required in order to orient to both elements of the utterance. In most cases it is not in the recipientÕs interest to explicitly topicalise their potential complicity when the imperative speaker has given them the means to skirt around it by responding solely to the explicit directive.
Previous research has shown that by doing something other than straight compliance, recipients can moderate or transform their compliance into some other action (e.g., to appear to be acting independently of the authority of the directive speaker without directly resisting the directive action (c.f., Kent 2012b on incipient compliance). Our data contained examples of recipients doing additional work to evidence an orientation to their accountability for failing to perform the directed action when it first became relevant.
In Extract 5, upon finishing a biscuit, Jessica stands on her chair and reaches towards the plate of biscuits in the centre of the table. She is sanctioned for this behaviour through DadÕs imperative directive that she should Òsi:t anÕ a::skÓ (line 8). In response, Jessica sits down abruptly (line 9) and then hunches her body position in a display of contrition (lines 11) before transitioning into a new activity (looking at Mum through the holes in her biscuit; line 12). Within the overall structural organisation of dining activities, normative behaviour is to request an out-of-reach item from a fellow diner who can reach (e.g., Òpass the bread (please)Ó in Extract 1). Such a request became noticeably absent when Jessica began unilaterally reaching for her biscuit. Her behaviour was observably not commensurate with normative mealtime behaviour for obtaining additional food items. DadÕs imperative selects the directed action (Òsi:t anÕ a::skÓ) as the (noticeably absent) relevant action. His imperative directive holds Jessica accountable for not previously treating Ôgetting a biscuitÕ as a collaborative endeavour by soliciting assistance from someone who could reach the plate.
Jessica spent quite some time manoeuvring herself to reach the biscuits (lines 2-8; see Figure 1a ). In contrast, following DadÕs imperative directive, her return to a seated position is so rapid she lands with an audible thump (line 9). Once seated, she hides her face with the biscuit (line 10) and contracts her body into a tight ball (line 11; see Figure 1b ). Whilst in this shrinking posture she transitions hiding into a playful activity of looking at her mother through the holes in the biscuit. Here Jessica works to do more than straightforward compliance (sitting down). Her additional shrinking gesture seems to hide away from the tacit orientation within the imperative that she had done something wrong -missing the relevant opportunity to ask for the biscuit whilst sitting correctly at the table. It perhaps also orients to the fact that she retained the biscuit when sitting and so did not comply with the Òand askÓ part of DadÕs imperative directive. We might describe this additional embodied work as a display of contrite compliance. Thus, JessicaÕs response to DadÕs imperative reveals her orientation to (and acceptance of) her accountability for failing to have performed the normatively relevant behaviour for gaining out-of-reach items at the table.
When a recipient withholds embodied compliance and instead responds verbally to an imperative it typically indexes resistance to performing the directed action (Craven & Potter, 2010; Mondada, 2011) . Accounts for non-compliance can provide evidence that participants orient to being held accountable for not having already performed the action that the imperative retrospectively directs them to perform. In Extract 6 four friends are playing a card game that is known to Amy and Dan, but is new to Briana and Charlie. On line 2 Amy plays and names her card (ÒGa:solineÓ), which completes her turn in the game and passes responsibility for progressing the game to the next player, Briana. Within the structure of the game, the next action that Briana should accountably perform is to draw a card from the deck at the centre of the table. Briana does not begin her turn immediately but freezes and frowns slightly at her cards (line 3). After 2.2 seconds, Amy directs her to ÒDraw a cardÓ (line 4). The imperative occurs after the directed action first became relevant. It directs Briana to perform an action she could, and should, have already done. In this sequential context that the imperative can be heard not only as directing Briana to begin her turn but also as holding her accountable for her failure to have already done so.
AmyÕs first imperative directive overlaps with the start of BrianaÕs exclamation of comprehension of the meaning of the gasoline card (line 5). BrianaÕs ÒohÓ-prefaced turn marks the moment of her public acknowledgment of having registered the change in her understanding (Heritage, 1998) . Her exclamation provides an account for not having already drawn a card on the grounds that she required additional time to comprehend AmyÕs previous within-game action. By making her delayed comprehension publicly available, Briana orients to the fact that not starting her turn immediately was an accountable matter (c.f., Robinson, 2016) . Her account rests on the invocation of her identity as a Ôgood studentÕ who is more concerned about learning (and understanding) the game than simply going through the motions without thought. She constructs the sense that it is not that she was inattentive and ÔmissedÕ the opportunity to draw her card, rather that she prioritised a full understanding of the implications of the previous card over swift gameplay. Accountability orientations in imperative directives that target noticeable absences can be resisted by characterising the absence as warranted in service to a desirable social action (in this case being an engaged student of the game).
Amy only minimally confirms BrianaÕs explanation (ÒyeahÓ) and then repeats her imperative directive, this time accompanied by a pointing gesture (line 6-8). The second version reinstates and even enhances the sense that Briana is accountable for failing to progress the game by starting her turn in a timely manner. It rejects BrianaÕs effort to understand the game as a viable account for delaying drawing a card and continues to hold her accountable.
Briana pushes back against the second imperative directive with her prosodically exaggerated Ò#I goddit I gawddit#Ó (line 9). This claims prior awareness that drawing a card was the next relevant action. Stivers (2004, p. 260) suggests that multiple sayings treat the prior speaker as having Òpersisted unnecessarily in the prior course of actionÓ (in this case issuing the repeated imperative) and indicates that they should desist. By the second imperative directive Briana has already begun preparations to take a card (line 5); she has shifted her grip on her cards to free her arm and started reaching for a new card (line 6). BrianaÕs response (line 9) resists the necessity of the imperative on the grounds that she was already aware of its relevance as a next action and was already engaged in the directed action so had not missed the opportunity to perform it.
Extracts 5 and 6 demonstrate some (but by no means all) of the ways recipients might orient to their accountability for failing to progress a projectably relevant course of action: They can accept their accountability and display contrition (Extract 5), attempt to provide a legitimate account (Extract 6 line 5) or reject the implication that they have done something for which they should be held accountable at all (Extract 6 line 8). In each case the recipients acknowledge the tacit accountability-orientation of the imperative directive.
Sources of Relevance for the Direction Action
Potentially any missed opportunity to perform an interactionally relevant action is an accountable matter in interaction (Garfinkel, 1983; 1967) . Although the specific contingencies that lead to the directed action becoming relevant vary in the examples above; the accountability-oriented imperative directives have each been made relevant within normative social organisations in interaction. The relevance of telling the story was sequentially generated following its initiation and subsequent go ahead (Extract 3). The incantation of Òbon appetitÓ at the dinner table marked the beginning of the meal and made relevant its consumption (Extract 4). Sitting and asking became a relevant next action within the normative rituals of mealtime etiquette when Jessica sought to procure an out-of reach biscuit (Extract 5). Drawing a card became a relevant next action within the overall structural organisation of the game once Amy played her card (Extract 6). In each case, an accountability-oriented imperative indexed the speakerÕs stance towards the projectable relevance of the directed action and the recipientÕs accountability for the inaction.
TURN DESIGN AND SEQUENTIAL POSITION
Orientations to accountability can be made more explicit through turn design features. Across the collection we regularly observed the use of prosody (e.g. ÒEa:tÓ in Extract 3 and ÒERR >scu:se me.< si:t anÕ a::sk.Ó in Extract 5), profanity (e.g., ÒgoddamnÓ in Extract 4) and propriety and promptness oriented adverbs (e.g., ÒCover your self up properlyÓ, ÒEat nicely pleaseÓ).!Although accountability-oriented turn design features are often present, this is not always the case. The timing of the imperative relative to the point at which the directed action first becomes relevant can be sufficient to convey an orientation to the recipientÕs accountability for the inaction. Extract 7 extends Extract 6 to include an additional imperative directive with almost identical turn design features to Òdraw a cardÓ (Òplay a mileÓ on line 11).! After Briana has drawn a new card she inspects it alongside her existing hand of cards. Whilst she is inspecting her cards in a display of deciding which one to play, Dan uses an imperative formulation to direct her to Òplay a mileÓ (line 12). Although grammatically and prosodically similar to Òdraw a cardÓ (line 8), the action is different. ÒPlay a mileÓ selects a ÔmileÕ card as the relevant type of card to play from all of the possible alternatives. Unlike Òdraw a cardÓ which treated Briana as remiss in not already having done so, ÒPlay a mileÓ seeks to expedite the card selection process that Briana was visibly engaged in. No such card selection activity was required prior to drawing a card from the face-down stack, nor was the playing of a ÔmileÕ card specifically relevant before the imperative directive. As such it is an affiliative action designed to assist Briana with the action she is currently performing rather than treat her as accountable for having failed to complete an already relevant action.
We can use BrianaÕs response as evidence of her understanding of the imperative directive. Her initial verbal response (ÒAlÕightÓ on line 14) acknowledges DanÕs choice of card type before she moves to play the card. Importantly, ÒalÕightÓ does not claim prior epistemic access to the need to play a mile or otherwise imply that Briana was aware of the relevance of playing a mile prior to the imperative directive being issued (Heritage, 2012) . It treats DanÕs imperative directive as an affiliative action designed to resolve the problem she was experiencing in choosing which card to play.
ÒPlay a mileÓ, whilst grammatically comparable to ÒDraw a cardÓ, has a very different orientation regarding BrianaÕs accountability for the directed action. It does not direct an already relevant action that the recipient could and should have performed. Instead it specifies which of a range of newly relevant actions should be performed now that they have become relevant. Despite the similar turn design features of the two imperative directives, Extract 7 demonstrates that participants are sensitive to the subtle timings of the relevance of actions relative to the imperatives that direct them and any additional accountability work that is conveyed by imperatives that occur after the recipient has failed to perform an already relevant next action. This is an issue we consider in more detail in the next section.
IMPERATIVES THAT COINCIDE WITH THE RELEVANCE OF DIRECTED ACTION
Whether an imperative holds the recipient accountable for a failure to perform a relevant action or simply directs them to perform a newly relevant action pivots, as we have seen, on its timing in relation to the moment at which the directed action becomes projectably relevant within the interaction. This tipping point is best illustrated with an example of an imperative timed to coincide precisely with the moment the directed action becomes relevant. In Extract 8, Rick and Luke are choosing which game pieces to use. Luke has the game pieces in front of him but has not yet selected one. After Rick chooses to play as the car (line 1), Luke continues to fiddle with the remaining pieces (lines 3-6). When Rick presses Luke to decide, using an imperative directive that orients to LukeÕs accountability (line 7), Luke begins to scoop up the game pieces, leaving one behind, which Rick then registers as the one he has selected (line 11; see Figure 2a ). As Luke begins to lift his hand from the board and move it towards the box, Rick directs him to Òput that on this thingÓ (line 12) and quickly taps a spot in the box (see Figure 2b ). This directive does not initiate a new course of action (cf., Òpass the bread (please)Ó in Extract 1), nor does it direct the recipient to perform a relevant action that has been displaced or withheld (cf., ÒeatÓ in Extract 3). It indicates where Luke should place the pieces at exactly the moment in which they begin their journey, thus expediting the completion of the action. Crucially, when Rick issues the directive, Luke could not have been expected to have already put the pieces in the box. Timed to coincide with the relevance of the directed action, the directive thus does not find fault in the otherÕs actions or inactions, but is rather an affiliative action designed to expedite an in-progress course of action.
DISCUSSION
Imperatives that are sequentially located after the directed action first becomes relevant in the interaction explicitly direct the actions of the recipient and tacitly hold them accountable for the inaction. Wherever a projectably relevant next action is not performed there exists the potential for someone to be held accountable. For example, Schegloff (1988, p. 125) states that noticing a negative event (e.g., Òyou didnÕt get an ice cream sandwichÓ) formulates a failure by the recipient and can be mobilised as a vehicle for complaining about the absence of a relevant action. We know that interlocutors are alert to the importance of monitoring the projectable relevance of actions, such that they might contribute to their smooth progression. For example, Kendrick & Drew (2016, p. 2) describe a range of Òpractised solutionsÓ through which individuals can anticipate and meet unexpressed needs of their co-participants. Relatedly, Drew and Couper-Kuhlen (2014) note that participants can be held accountable for failing to observe obvious attempts to recruit their help and respond in a timely manner.
We have argued that the sequential position of the imperative directive is crucial, a Ôtop-downÕ analysis in LevinsonÕs (2013) terms, but we have also identified turnconstructional practices that routinely occur in accountability-oriented imperative directives, a Ôbottom-upÕ solution. These practices range from relatively explicit (e.g., profanity) to more subtle (e.g., prosodic stress). We suggest, however, that any imperative directive that occurs after the relevance of the directed action has been established is vulnerable to being heard as holding the recipient accountable. In many cases, we find a mutually elaborative harmony between the position and composition of imperative actions (c.f., Schegloff, 1995) . In this way our results are similar to CurlÕs (2006) analysis of the congruity between the sequential environment and syntactic design of offers. Yet we have broadened the notion of Ôsequential positionÕ to encompass positions that emerge not only within sequences of talk, but also within practical courses of action. We have shown that even units of talk with the same syntactic design (i.e., imperative grammar) can perform different actions in different positions. Our analysis also contributes to previous research on the relationship between projectability and directives/requests (e.g., Mondada, 2014a; Rossi, 2014) , showing how the normative structures of projectable courses of action furnish resources for action formation.
Imperative directives privilege getting the action done over other concerns, including, as we have seen here, soliciting accounts for social transgressions. Imperatives are not overtly designed to elicit an account in the way that account-implicative interrogatives (Bolden & Robinson, 2011) , accusations (e.g., Drew, 1978) , complaints (e.g., Dersley & Wootton, 2000; Drew, 1998) , noticings (Antaki, 1994) , or other formats that routinely generate responsive accounts might. Using an imperative formulation signals that the speakerÕs primary concern is to restore the progressivity of the action rather than to topicalise the recipientÕs transgression. Nevertheless, our analysis has shown that imperatives located after the relevance of the directed action do treat the recipient as accountable for failing to progress the directed action. When delivered after the directed action first became relevant, imperatives are a tacit and covert way of holding recipients accountable for their transgressions. In this respect they are not unlike the implicit format for correcting (Jefferson, 1987) or pursuing a response (Bolden, Mendelbaum & Wilkinson, 2012) .
One social context in which tacit accountability orientations might facilitate a relevant social action is in the arena of socialising novices into socially normative behaviours. Perhaps unsurprisingly, our game playing and family mealtime corpora were replete with such actions. By using an imperative where the explicit focus is on getting the action done one can avoid forcing the recipient into a situation where their ignorance or disobedience is topicalised, whilst still tacitly indexing a failure. Imperatives that occur after the relevance of the directed action direct the recipient to perform the action, thus progressing the course of action and enabling participation in the overall activity to continue. They explicitly identify the action that should already have been performed, thereby scaffolding the recipientÕs future performance of socially normative behaviour and remedying the (unstated) possibility of the recipient not knowing what action should have been performed. They tacitly treat the recipient as responsible for the transgression without soliciting or making relevant an account for the failure, thus retrospectively enforcing social norms. This provides an opportunity for the recipient to learn normative standards of acceptable behaviour from specific moments of transgression of social norms without delaying the progressivity of the course of action during the interaction.
CONCLUSION
A normative metric of progressivity underpins the sequential organisation of interaction. Imperative directives are a resource available for managing the progressivity of our interlocutorsÕ actions. When things are expected to be done at a particular place in the interaction and they are not done there is a breach of the normal progressivity of the action. Imperatives can be used to draw attention to moments when a course of action is failing to progress according to normative expectations. Imperatives are one tool for retrospectively marking the breach and enforcing the social norms of progressivity by restoring the forward momentum of the course of action. Thus, accountability-oriented imperative directives are a tool for the ex post facto enforcement of social norms.
The timing of the imperative relative to the progressivity of the action is sufficient to indicate whether it straightforwardly directs the actions of the recipient or simultaneously directs and holds then accountable for their prior inaction. The explicitness of the accountability orientation can be enhanced through the inclusion of additional prosodic or lexical markers that index accountability. However, if you tell someone to do an action that they could have and should have already performed, the directive is potentially hearable as admonishing the recipient purely by virtue of its relationship to progressivity.
CONVENTIONS FOR MULTIMODAL TRANSCRIPTION
!
Embodied actions are transcribed following the conventions developed by Mondada (2014b) .
* * + +
Gestures and descriptions of embodied actions are delimited between ++ two identical symbols (one symbol per participant) and are synchronized with correspondent stretches of talk. *---> --->* The action described continues across subsequent lines until the same symbol is reached.
>>
The action described begins before the excerptÕs beginning. --->>
The action described continues after the excerptÕs end. ..... ActionÕs preparation. ,,,,, ActionÕs retraction. ali Participant doing the embodied action is identified when (s)he is not the speaker.
fig #
The exact moment at which a screen shot has been taken is indicated with a specific sign showing its position within turn at talk.
